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LLOYD  L.  WEI-REB'
SOME  OF  YOU  WILL  HAVE  NOTICED  that  the  title  of  my  talk  this
afternoon  is borrowed  from  the title of the  lectures that  inaugurated
this series,  thirty-nine  years ago.2  The person who  gave those lectures,
Alexander  d'Entr~ves,  was  one  of the  great  philosophers  of natural
law.  His  statement of the case  for  natural law  can  fairly be described
as  definitive  for  its  time.  He  himself  observed,  however,  that  the
case for natural law  "must  needs appear  in a different light according
to  the  angle  in  time  or  in  place  from  which  it  is  looked  at." '3  It
seems  to  me that the case  for natural  law in  1954 is  not the  case  for
natural  law  today:  that  some  of its  claims  then  are  made  no  longer
and  that  some  new  ones  take  their  place,  and  similarly  that  some
objections  to  natural law  have  lost their  force  and  some  others  have
arisen  in  their  stead.  This  development  of the  case  for  natural  law
is  to the  good.  We have  made  real progress.  For  all  that, it  remains
true,  as  d'Entr~ves  said then,  that  "the  case  for  natural  law  is  not
an  easy  one to  put  clearly  and convincingly." '4
My  purpose  is  to  reexamine  the  case  for  natural  law  once  again
and  to state  what  I  believe  it to  be,  as  clearly  and  convincingly  as  I
can.  For  all the attention  it has  received  in the  past several  decades,
natural  law  remains  a  guest  at  the  philosophic  table,  more  often
tolerated  as  an  object  of bemused  curiosity  or  benign  neglect  than
welcomed.  I  believe,  rather,  that it should  have  an  honored  place  at
the table, for it is at the very center of reflection about our experience-
that  to  which  we  refer,  quite  precisely,  as  the  human  condition.  I
shall,  perforce,  take  you  some  distance  into  the  territory  usually
occupied by metaphysics and shall occasionally refer to a not everyday
philosophic  concept  like  "ontology."  But  I  agree  with  d'Entrves
that  when  one  is  making  the  case  for  natural  law,  "it  is  better  not
©  1993  Lloyd  L.  Weinreb.
1.  Darre Professor  of  Law,  Harvard  Law  School.  This  article  is  unchanged
from the Natural  Law Forum  Annual Lecture,  delivered at Notre Dame  Law School
on  April  29, 1993.
2.  A.P.  d'Entreves,  "The  Case  for  Natural  Law  Re-Examined,"  1 Nat. L.F.
(1956),  p.  5.  The lectures  were given  on  October  9 and  10,  1954.
3.  Ibid., p.  5.
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to drive too  many  metaphysical  nails into  the jurist's head." '5 And  I
assure you in advance that the case that I shall make contains  nothing
that  you do not  already  know,  even  if you  have  not  thought about
it  in  just  this  way.  Indeed,  it  is  a central  part of the  argument  that
you do  know  all  of it without  needing to  be  told.
In  1954,  if the Thomistic  natural  law tradition  within the Catholic
Church  is  left  aside,  natural  law  was  mostly  identified  as  a  theory
about  law  and,  as  such,  within  the  province  of  jurisprudence.  The
case against natural  law,  which went  by the name of legal positivism,
was  also  a  theory  about  law,  a  topic  within  jurisprudence.  The
principal issue  for  both  theories  could be  formulated  as  the question
whether  an immoral  law  is properly  regarded  as law at all.  Defenders
of natural law  said  no and legal  positivists  said  yes.  I hope that  that
way of formulating  the issue seems  odd to you;  for,  although  it was
discussed  at  great  length  and  gave  rise  to  some  excellent  writing,  it
was  an  odd  question.  We  all  know,  and  it  was  known  then,  that
there  is  a  difference  between  a  provision  of  the  Internal  Revenue
Code-even  one that  we strongly disapprove-and  a gunman's order
to "hand  over your wallet,"  which  difference  the positivists  accused
the proponents of natural law of ignoring, and a difference of another
kind  between,  say,  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  and  the  Emancipation
Proclamation, which the proponents of natural law accused positivists
of ignoring.  And those easily  recognized differences,  plus,  of course,
some  good -will,  are  all  that  one  needs  to  see  that  the  debate  had
somehow  gone  off  the  rails.  The  best  product  of  the  debate  is
probably the famous exchange  between Hart  and Fuller in the Harvard
Law Review. 6 Yet  even  there,  a number  of difficult,  important issues
were summed  up  under the rubric,  "Is  an immoral  law  really  law?"
It is  not  accidental  that notwithstanding  their disagreement  on  every
important issue within  the  debate,  Hart  and Fuller reached  the saine
practical  conclusions  about  their  most significant,  testing  example.7
I  rarely  see  that  question  in  that  form  asked  anymore.  From  the
distance  of  four  decades  the  debate  of  the  1950's  turns  out  not  to
5. Ibid.,  p.  38.
6.  H.L.A.  Hart,  "Positivism  and the Separation  of Law and Morals,"  71  Harv.
L.  Rev.  (1958)  p.  593;  Lon  L.  Fuller,  "Positivism  and  Fidelity  to  Law-A  Reply
to  Professor Hart,"  71  Harv.  L.  Rev.  (1958),  p.  630.
7.  Both  Hart  and  Fuller  defend  a retroactive  statute  as the  means  for  dealing
with  acts  committed  by  Germans  while  the  Nazis  were  in  power  that  were  highly
immoral  but  were  legitimate  under  Nazi  law.  See  Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, pp.  619-20;  Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A  Reply to Professor
Hart, p.  661.LLOYD  L.  WEINREB
be timeless,  as it then seemed,  but  peculiarly timebound.  It had some
historical  antecedents  in  jurisprudence,  it  is  true;  but  they  alone
would  not  have  sustained  the  debate.  The  debate  of the  1950's  was
sustained  by  history,  the  appalling  phenomenon  of  Naziism,  which
forced  on  us  an  awareness  of unspeakable  human  evil,  carried  out
with the pretensions and  efficiency  of the modern state.  We  are now
more  aware  of  the  enormous  variety  of  ordinary  laws:  ordinary  at
least  in  the  sense  that,  wise  or  not,  moral  or  not,  they  are  within
our contemplation-their  immorality,  if that  is  what  we  conclude,  is
speakable.  Whether  we should  be glad  or regretful  of that  change,  I
do not  say; it is not so obvious  to me how to regard  the unbridgeable
gulf between  humankind  and  angels;  for  if it  is  only  on  the  human
side of the gulf that  we  stumble,  it  is  also  only on  that  side that,  as
humans,  we  walk  erect.
In  this  context,  it  is  difficult  even  to  make  sense  of the  question,
"Is  an  immoral  law  really  law?"  or,  as.the  question  also  was  put,
"Can  a  'law'  be  too  immoral  to  be  law?"  Instead,  prompted  in
good  part  by  the  work  of Ronald  Dworkin,  legal  philosophers  ask
questions  about  how judges-good  judges  -do  and ought to decide
cases.  To  what  extent  does  a  stated  rule  of law  dictate  the result  in
a particular  case?  To  what  extent  is  a conscientious  judge  committed
to  discovering  a  uniquely  right  answer?  Or  questions  about  how
ordinary  persons  should understand  their  legal obligations,  when  the
obligations  conform  to  their  moral  understandings  and  especially
when  they  do  not.  If the  question,  "What  is  my  obligation  to  obey
an immoral  law?"  is still asked,  it is recognized  implicitly or explicitly
that  the  answer  is  found  not  within  the  province  of  jurisprudence
but outside  it. Borrowing  Dworkin's  apt  metaphor,  "law's  empire" 8
extends  beyond  the  domain  of  law  and  is  at  the  same  time  within
and  subject  to  an empire  greater  still.
If in  this  way  natural  law  plays  a  somewhat  diminished  role  on
the jurisprudential  stage,  it has become  more prominent  on the larger
stage  of politics  and  social  theory.  Clarence  Thomas  may not  have
given  natural law  more than  its  equivalent  of Andy Warhol's  fifteen
minutes  of fame;  but the  very  fact that  he,  like Martin  Luther  King
and  others,  referred  to  natural  law  directly  in  support  of  political
argument  is  remarkable.  What  it  signals  is  that  natural  law  has
acquired distinctly normative  significance  independent of its relevance
for  law.
8.  Ronald  Dworkin,  Law's Empire  (1986).4  THE AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  JURISPRUDENCE  (1993)
The  focus  of  natural  law  has  thus  shifted  dramatically  from  one
internal  to  the  law  to  one  that  is  outside  and  independent  of  it.
Whereas  previously  it  was  concerned  to  differentiate  phenomena
within  the  general  ambit  of  law,  distinguishing  that  which  did  and
that  which  did  not  satisfy  certain  normative  criteria,  it  now  is
concerned  in the  first  instance  to defend  the  objectivity-or  validity
or  reality,  it  comes  to  the  same  thing-of  the  normative  criteria
themselves.  Only  secondarily,  having  established  the  objectivity  of
normative  criteria,  does  it  apply  them  to  law  or  insist  that  they  be
applied  and  draw  conclusions  about  the  content  of  the  law,  the
judge's  act  of  interpreting  the  law,  or  the  citizen's  obligation  of
compliance.  The jurisprudential  issues  have become  subsidiary to the
general  normative  question:  Are  there  objective  moral  principles?  Is
there  an  objective  moral  order?9
A  further  notable  feature  about  recent  concern  with  natural  law,
which  should  attract  more  attention  than  it  does,  is  that  its
nonjurisprudential  normative  significance  is  just  about  always
formulated  in terms of rights.' 0  The accepted  account of how natural
law  became  associated  with rights is  well known.  After  around  1500,
as  the  individual  emerged  from  the  social  context  and  became  the
protagonist of western political philosophy,  older, ontological  notions
of  natural  law  were  simply  appropriated  and  put  to  new  use  in
defense  of  the  individual.  Speculation  about  a  universal  normative
order as an aspect of the real was succeeded  by concern for normative
relations  among  humankind,  also  as  an  aspect  of  the  real.  So,  to
mention one well-known  example,  John  Locke,  with scarcely  a pause
in  the  narrative,  resorted  to  natural  law  to  shore  up  certain  rights
of the  individual  against  claims  of the  community  or the  king  as  its
representative."  That  this  was  a departure  from  classic  natural  law
is  evident;  rights  as  such  are  not  much  in  evidence  in  the  natural
9.  That  is  so,  at  any  rate,  for  those  who  continue  the  debate  about  natural
law.  Those  who  regard  it as  a  philosophical  curiosity  simply  ignore  it.  To  say  that
the jurisprudential  issue  is  subsidiary  is  not  to say  that it  is  unimportant.  For those
of us  who  are  especially  concerned  about  law,  the  hypothesis  that  there  are  moral
truths  has the  specific  significance  that  laws  contrary  to  such  truths  are  in  a  sense
not  properly  laws  at  all,  for  they  would  prescribe  conduct  that  one  ought  not,  all
things  considered,  adopt.  See John  Finnis,  Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980),
pp.  360-61.
10.  Oddly,  the  principal  exception  is  John  Finnis's  deservedly  much  discussed
Natural Law and Natural Rights, which  makes  the  connection  between  natural  law
and  rights  in  its  title.
11.  J. Locke,  Two  Treatises of Government §§6-8  (J.  Laslett,  ed.  1960)  pp.  311-LLOYD  L.  WEINREB
law  of  Thomas  Aquinas  or  the  classical  Greek  conceptions  from
which  it derived.  But  it was  not,  as  it  sometimes  is  made  to appear,
a  fortuitous  (if  serendipitous)  borrowing  of  whatever  was to  hand.
On the contrary,  I  shall suggest,  natural  law properly conceived  was
the  obvious,  even  inevitable,  vehicle  for the  view  of rights that  was
at  stake.
Since the eighteenth  century,  our conception of nature has changed
from  moral  tutor  and  taskmaster  to  a  vast  cornucopic  warehouse,
from  which  we  select  according  to  our  own  needs  and  desires.
Unsurprisingly,  therefore,  it is not so common  anymore to talk  about
natural  rights.  Rather  we  talk  about  human  rights.  Since  the  two
concepts  are  equally  ambiguous  and,  for  aught  that  appears,  are
extensionally  the same,  the substitution of the  human for the natural
has  not  occasioned  much  controversy;  indeed  it  seems  scarcely  to
have  been noticed.  But it  ought to  be  attended to  closely  and  taken
quite  seriously;  for  it is  of the  greatest  significance.  The  key  to the
re-examined  case  for natural  law,  I  believe,  is  found just there.
To  understand  how  our  current  engagement  with  human  rights
makes  the  case  for  natural  law,  we  have  to  look  deeper  into  the
connection between  natural law  and rights generally.  And to do that,
we  have  briefly  to  go  back  to  the  beginning.  The  phrase  "natural
law"  can  be traced  quite precisely  to Cicero,  the Roman  lawyer and
orator  who  survives  in  third-year  Latin  classes  more  than  anywhere
else.  Cicero  was  not a  great  thinker;  he was  a great  talker.  But  he
was  a  bit  of  an  intellectual  magpie;  and  so  far  as  he  subscribed  to
a  philosophy,  he  was  a  Stoic.  In  view  of  the  Roman  distaste  for
abstractions  and  regard  for  law-the pax Romana-as the  mortar
that  held  civilization  together,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Cicero  used
the  concept  of law  to  express  the principal  element  of the  stoic idea
of  Logos:  an  ordered  universe  in  which  events  fulfill  an  inherent
purposiveness  that  provides  its  own  justification-what  I  have
elsewhere  called  "normative  natural  order."' 2  Just  as  the  law  of
Rome  made orderly the known,  civilized  world,  so,  he suggested,  the
law  of nature-natural  law-made  the physical  universe  a  coherent,
orderly  whole.  From  our  point  of  view  two  thousand  years  later,
that  conception  of natural  law  literally  understood  on its  own terms
is not simply wrong; the proposition that whatever happens to happen
is,  merely  in  virtue  of  its  happening,  what  ought  to  happen  is
incoherent-high-level  gibberish.  If one  adds  some  external  guiding
force,  an  abstraction  like  Logos,  the incoherence  can  be hidden;  but
12.  L.  Weinreb,  Natural Law and Justice (1987),  pp.  6-7.6  THE AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  JURISPRUDENCE  (1993)
it does not  overcome the axiomatic  principle,  however  it  is put,  that
is and  ought,  fact  and value,  are distinct.  The  Greeks  did  not think
so.  There  is  pervasively  in  their literature,  not  as  a  poetic faron de
parler but as a profound truth,  brooding recognition that our existence
is  purposeful  and  our joys  and  our  suffering  alike  are  not  without
meaning,  whether  or not  we  see  it. That  is  what,  at least  sometimes,
Cicero  meant  by  natural  law,  although  characteristically  he  did  not
linger  over  the  puzzles.  And  sometimes,  he  seems  to  have  meant
something  much  more  modest:  only  that  ordinary  human  reason,
logos  with  a small  "I,"  is  a sound  prudential  guide.
The fertile ambiguity of the term "natural  law"  helped it to survive
after  Cicero.  While  the  Roman  Empire  and  the  Christian  Church
maintained  an  uneasy  coexistence  and  the  former  gave  way  to  the
latter,  Roman  lawyers  and  the  fathers  of the  Church  made  natural
law the repository  of their a priori  certainties  and a posteriori  doubts
about  the  human  condition.  For  the  lawyers,  natural  law-ius
naturale-gave  the universal law of nations-ius gentium-a normative
dimension  that  a mere  amalgam  of the law  of Rome  with  disparate
foreign  laws  of the  far-flung  empire  would  not  have  had.  And  for
the  Church  fathers,  natural  law  preserved  the  reality  of  the  early
Christian ideals  of freedom,  equality,  and, incidentally,  communism,
without  condemning  the  palpable  lack  of  individual  freedom  or
equality  or  even  the  existence  of  slavery  in  the  actual  law  and
institutions  of society. 3  Although the  precise  formulations  by which
they  performed  this  metaphysical  juggling  act  varied,  it  remained
throughout  an affirmation,  not  an  explanation.  That  is,  lawyers  and
fathers  alike asserted  confidently that the normative realm was  actual
without explaining  much  at all how  the actual  realm  was normative.
This  development  came  to  fruition  in  Thomas  Aquinas'  classic
exposition.  Pulling  together  the  multiple  variations  on  the  same
theme,  he  filled  the linguistic  container  provided  by Cicero  with  the
substance  of the  ancient  Greek  view  as  it  had  been  communicated
to  the  thirteenth  century  in a new,  distinctly  Christian  guise.
In  Thomas'  formulation,  reason,  the  heritage  of the  Greeks,  and
faith,  an  abiding  confidence  in  the  Christian  God,  come  together.
The  normative  natural  order,  and  we  within  it,  are  part  of  God's
Providence.  More  particularly,  our  awareness  of  our  own  freedom,
our  individual  moral  responsibility,  is  not  inconsistent  with  God's
providential  order  but  is  rather  a  manifestation  of  it.  As  Thomas
put it:
13.  For a  brief account,  see  ibid., pp. 44-49.LLOYD  L.  WEINREB
Now  among  all  others  the  rational  creature  is  subject  to  Divine
providence  in  the  most excellent  way,  in  so  far  as  it  partakes  of
a share  of providence,  by  being  provident  both  for  itself  and  for
others.  Wherefore  it has  a share  of the  Eternal  Reason,  whereby
it .has  a  natural  inclination  to  its  proper  act  and  end:  and  this
participation  of the  eternal  law  in  the  rational  creature  is  called
the  natural  law."
It  is  easy  to  find  in  that  statement  a  specifically  theological
reformulation  of the  stoic equation  of Logos,  the purposive  force  in
nature,  and  logos,  the  human  capacity  rationally  to  choose  one's
own  end.  But-and  it  is  a  large  "but"-it  contains  nothing  that
explains  how we can  be both  subject  to  God's  Providence  and  free,
provident  for ourselves.  Nor  is  there  anything  in  it that  tells  us the
actual  content  of God's  Providence  or  what God would  have  of us.
For  the  former  we  require  faith;  and  for  the  latter,  we  require  the
aid  of God's  holy  church.  There  are  elsewhere  in  Thomas'  writings
some actual  prescriptions of how we ought to behave.  On inspection,
however,  insofar  as  they  are  not  general,  indeterminate  abstractions,
like  "good is to  be done and pursued, and evil is to  be avoided,"'5
they  turn out  to  reflect  the  conventional  moral  premises  of  western
Europe  in  the  thirteenth  century.  That,  of course,  does  not  make
them  incorrect.  It  does  not  make  them  correct  either,  however,
although some prescriptions of Thomas,  as interpreted by the Church,
may  be  authoritative  for  that  reason.  From  the  distance  of  seven
centuries,  Thomas'  achievement  so  described  may seem  less than  his
reputation  would  have  it.  But  it  was  not  his  concern,  even  if  it  is
ours,  either  to demonstrate  God's  Providence  or to  validate a moral
code.  God's  Providence  and  the  moral  authority  of  the  church
required no demonstration;  they were premises from which he started.
Coming  back to  the  present,  the  first point  that  I  want to  make
is  that  it  is  no  part  of  the  case  for  natural  law  that  it  furnishes
conclusive  answers to our concrete moral  dilemmas.  It never was and
it  is  not  now.  The  endings  of  Sophocles'  great  tragedies,  in  which
the Greek source of natural law is most visible, are not pronouncements
of  moral  truths.  They  are  an  affirmation  of the  truth of morality:
notwithstanding  Oedipus'  unavoidable  and,  as  we  see  it,  undeserved
doom,
16 notwithstanding the divinely inspired madness that led Creon
14.  Thomas Aquinas,  Summa Theologica,  I-1I,  q.  91,  a. 2  (Fathers of the  English
Dominican  Province,  trans.  1947)  p.  997.
15.  Ibid.,  I-II,  q.  94,  a.  2,  p.  1009.
16.  Sophocles,  Oedipus the King.8  THE AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  JURISPRUDENCE  (1993)
on  the  tragic  path  of  excess,' 7  they  dwelt  in  a  normatively  ordered
universe,  in which,  as  the Chorus  says  at the  end  of the Antigone,
Our  happiness  depends
on  wisdom  all the  way.
The  gods  must have  their  due.'8
Similarly,  the  natural  law  of  Thomas  Aquinas  gave  assurance  that
our  moral dilemmas  are real  and are to be  answered  in  moral terms,
that  moral  judgment  is  not  illusory;  but  it  did  not  itself,  except
incidentally,  purport  to describe that reality concretely'  So also  now,
the  case  for  natural  law  must  be  that  there  is  a  basis  for  an
affirmation  of the  truth, or reality,  of morality-a  basis  for denying
that,  as  Jocasta  said  to Oedipus,
•  . . chance  is  all in  all
Best  to  live  lightly,  as  one  can,  unthinkingly 9
That speaks intelligibly to us as inhabitants of the end of the twentieth
century.
A way to  describe  what  has  happened  since  the thirteenth  century
is that the metaphysical  assumptions of modern  physical  science  have
driven the Thomistic  synthesis  between reason  and  faith apart.  There
is  not an  opposition  between  them,  as Augustine  had  urged;  rather,
they are  simply separate  and belong to different  realms of our being.
The consequence  is  that the assumptions  that  gave  specific,  concrete
content  to earlier  versions  of natural  law  have  lost  their  power  over
reason.  For  those  who,  lacking  faith,  have  discarded  those
assumptions,  the  fundamental,  unexplained  affirmation  of  natural
law seems,  therefore,  to  be no  more  than  a  fond  hope,  a  wish,  or  a
dream.  Like Oedipus,  when he  believed momentarily that the oracle's
prediction  had  been  proved  false,  they may  declare,
...  they,
The  oracles,  as  they stand  ...
...  they're  dead...
... and  worthless.2 0
One  way  or  another,  implicitly  or  explicitly,  all  the  recent  work
about natural law-in its defense or in opposition-has been  concerned
with that problem.
17.  Sophocles,  Antigone.
18.  Sophocles,  Antigone,  1348-1350  (Elizabeth  Wyckoff trans.)  in  David  Grene
& Richmond  Lattimore,  eds.,  2  The  Complete Greek Tragedies (1959),  p.  204.
19.  Sophocles,  Oedipus the King, 977-979 (David Grene trans.) in  2 The Complete
Greek Tragedies, p.  52.
20.  Sophocles,  Oedipus  the King, 970-973 (David Grene trans.) in  2  The Complete
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I believe  that  the case  for  natural  law  can  be  made  in  a way that
speaks to our time:  that is, that  one can affirm  significantly,  without
dependence  on  the  metaphysical  assumptions  of  the  past,  that  the
moral  dimension  of human  experience  is  real.  To do  so,  we need  to
look  not beyond  ourselves  but  within.
Much  as  we  may  disagree  about  who  is  responsible,  for  good  or
for ill,  for some  occurrence,  or about  whether anyone  is responsible,
or  about  the  extent  of  a  specific  person's  responsibility  in  view  of
his  particular  characteristics,  the  reality  of  human  responsibility  is
not  in  doubt.  Whatever  thoughts  we  may  entertain  to  the  contrary
in  a mood  of philosophical  speculation  or  a  moment of  despair,  we
live  in  a  condition  of  human  freedom  and  hence,  human  desert.  It
is  a  structural  fact  of our  experience,  which  cannot  be  contradicted
without  altering  the  nature  of  our  experience,  not  merely  in  some
concrete  particular(s) but in a  fundamental way,  making it a different
experience  entirely.  To deny that human beings are  responsible is not
like  denying  that  they  have  opposable  digits  or  denying  that  there
are any human  beings on an island that we had thought was inhabited.
Those  denials  would  be  startling  enough,  but  we  could  adjust.  The
denial of human  responsibility  does not merely omit some information
or  contradict  something  that  we  had  strongly  taken  for  granted.  It
transforms the very nature of what  we,  as  human  beings,  experience.
So,  although  one  might  translate  the  description  of  an  event  that
refers  to a person  as a responsible  agent into a description  that omits
such  reference,  the translation  would not be fully equivalent,  because
responsibility  has no  equivalent  in  those  terms.  It  is  fundamental.
That, in  a sense,  is the  problem.  Responsibility  and the  desert that
responsibility  implicates  depend  on freedom. 2'  How can  we in  reason
affirm human responsibility and at the same time recognize the causal
determinacy  of the natural  order?  But  we do not  reason  our  way to
human responsibility;  and we do not have  to,  because it  is where  we
start. That always has been the starting point of natural law. Eliminate
human  responsibility  and  the  whole  Theban  epic,  Oedipus  and  the
21.  I recognize  that  some philosophers  have  sought  to  break  the  bond  between
freedom  and  responsibility  or  desert.  However  ingenious,  their  arguments  to  that
effect  are unpersuasive  in the face  of universal recognition  that if one truly "couldn't
help it,"  blame (or praise) is inappropriate.  As  I have  said  elsewhere:  "Acting  freely
means  that how  I  act  is  up to me  as  an initiating,  self-determining  agency,  no more
or  less.  A  complete  causal  explanation  does  not  leave  the  matter  up  to  me  or
anything  else.  So  far  as  freedom  in  that  sense-which  is  the  only  sense  for  the
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rest,  is  nothing  more  than  a bit of  cosmic  slapstick,  one  hero  after
another slipping over and over again on a giant banana peel.  Eliminate
human  responsibility  and the self-providence  of the rational creature,
"this  participation  of the  eternal  law  ...  [that]  is  called  the natural
law,"  is  gone.  The metaphysical  settings  that sustain those  solutions,
are  profoundly  different  from  our  own;  but the fundamental  human
experience  on  which  they  build has  not changed.
The  case  for  natural  law  today  is  made  by  locating  the  grounds
of responsibility  not in  an  impenetrable  normative  natural  order  nor
in  divine  Providence  sustained  by  faith  but  concretely  in  what  is the
case.Y  It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  now  as  heretofore  the case
for  natural  law  must be cast  in  ontological terms;  it must affirm  the
actuality  of  morality,  not  merely  as  an  attitude  or  belief,  however
widely shared,  but as  something  objectively real  or true. Such  a case,
natural  law sub species 1993,  is  made  by grounding  responsibility  on
the  deep  conventions  that  constitute  a  human  community.  To  rely
on  convention  in  this  way  will  seem  contrary  to  the  ontological
requirement  on  which  I  have  insisted.  The  bridge  is  made  if  we
notice that responsibility is the  concomitant of rights, the due powers
that  constitute  human  beings  and  only  human  beings  as  persons
rather  than  things.
The  connection  between  responsibility  and  rights  is  familiar.  It  is
a commonplace  of moral exhortation  that there are no rights without
responsibility,  a  commonplace  of  political  rhetoric  that  there  is  no
responsibility  without  rights.  (Or,  as  our  forefathers  said  more
specifically,  "No  taxation  without representation.")  The  connection
is,  however, much tighter than that. To say that a person is responsible
in some  respect  for  an  occurrence  is to  say  that  he  had  a right that
was  dispositive  of the outcome  in that respect.  To  say that a person
has  a right  is to say that,  the right  being honored,  he  is  responsible
for the  outcome  to  the extent of the  right.2 3  So  to speak  extends  the
22.  Nothing that  I have said  is  intended to deny or belittle  premises  founded  on
faith.  However,  faith is  individual.  It  can prescind  argument,  but  it  does  not  take
its place.
23.  That  will  seem  perversely  contrary  to  a  familiar  example:  The  robber  who
takes  my wallet  is  responsible  for  taking it,  and  he  will  be  found  guilty of robbery
precisely  because  he had  no  right  to take  it.  The  right  that  establishes  his  respon-
sibility,  however,  needs  to  be  stated  with  some  care.  In  this  instance,  the  robber
had  a duty-and  therefore a right-not  to take  the  wallet.  Although when  we speak
of  a  duty,  we  do  not  need  also  to  mention  the  right,  it  is  there,  in  this  case
subsumed  within  the  robber's  general  liberty  to determine  his  conduct.  Unless  the
robber  had  that  right,  or  liberty,  he  would  not  be  responsible,  whether  he  were
compelled  to  take  the  wallet,  on  one  hand,  or  prevented  from  doing  so,  on  the
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usual  reference  to  rights  by  including  among  them  capacities  or
powers  that are  less  than one  would  like  as  well as  those  that one  is
glad to claim.  It shifts  the focus  of rights  from the  duties of others,
which  are  the  typical  "pay-off"  of rights,  to the  specifically  moral
situation  of  the  actor  himself.  To  explain  how  that  connection  is
made  concretely  in  specific  contexts  requires  more  time than  I  am
able  to  give  it  here.  Without  pursuing  the  matter  further,  I  shall
simply  affirm  that  a reconsideration  of the  concept  of a right  along
these  lines  can  be  carried  out  that  is  both  internally  coherent  and
consistent  with  related  concepts  and  that  greatly  clarifies  our
understanding  of rights and  responsibility  alike.24
Rights  are  typically  assigned  to  normative  discourse.  Indeed  they
are commonly described as the most fundamental  element of normative
discourse,  its primary, unanalyzable  "building  blocks."  But if human
responsibility  arises  directly  in  our experience  without  the  mediation
of reason  and  if responsibility  and rights  are  two ways  of expressing
the  same  moral  cognition,  then  rights  too  are  an  aspect  of  that
experience;  they  can  be  described  not  simply  as  valid  or  invalid,
according  to  further  normative  premises,  but  as  real  or  actual,  as
much  as  responsibility  itself.  Without  them,  as  I  have  said,  our
experience  of  ourselves  as  human  would  be  a  different  experience
entirely.
That may  sound like  a gross confusion  between  the normative  and
the  descriptive;  but it  is  what  I intend.  I  should  argue  that it  is  not
confusion,  but  is  rather  an  accurate  description  of  our  experience,
which  fulfills the ontological claim of natural law.  It  is substantiated,
moreover,  by  the  most  insistent  puzzle  about  rights,  which  none  of
the  theories  of  rights  as  exclusively  normative  is  able  to  resolve.
Rights  are  somehow  prior  to  our  judgments  about  what  is  right  or
good;  they  have  a  quality  of independent  validity  or  objectivity  that
separates  them  from  consideration  of  what  is  the  right  course  of
action  or  what  is best  on the  whole.  Yet,  too  plainly  to be  ignored,
they  are  variable  from  one  community  to  another.  Although  there
are,  I  believe,  some  rights  that attach to  all human beings  simply  as
such,  there  is  another,  larger  category  of  rights,  usually  designated
as  civil  rights, that  are validated within a specific  community but are
nevertheless  prior to and independent  of the community's  laws, which
24.  Such  an  account  of rights  is  elaborated  at  length  in  my  book  Oedipus at
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may  be  criticized  precisely  because  they  fail  fully  to  protect  civil
rights.  Yet  how,  we are  constantly led to  ask,  can the community  be
the  source  of  both  the  standard  of  evaluation  and  that  which  is
evaluated?  The  perplexity  of  reason  notwithstanding,  there  is  an
indissoluble  fusion  of  the  real  and  the  normative.  Rights  theorists
typically  notice the puzzle and throw up their hands;  they acknowledge
that  rights are sui generis and  let  it go at  that.
I have  already intimated  what  I  believe  is the solution.  Rights  arise
together  with  responsibility  directly  in  our  experience.  Both  alike
depend  on the  actual,  ongoing  conventions  of an  established  social
order.  By  convention  I  do  not  mean  the  small  practices  of  social
intercourse,  matters like dress or polite behavior, that we  may dismiss
as  merely  conventional.  I  mean  rather  what  the  Greeks  meant  by
nomos:  the  fixed,  established  ways  of  the  community  that  were
themselves  a ground  of  moral  judgment,  distinct  only  from  physis,
the necessary,  unalterable  normative order of nature. Such conventions
are  a  matter  of  fact  and  contestable,  although  they  have  normative
significance.  A person  is responsible  or  she  is not,  deserves  or  does
not  deserve.  It  is  simply  meaningless  to say  that  a  person  ought  to
be, or  ought not to be,  responsible-even  though we may  assert  that
she  ought  to  be  held  responsible  or  not  (or  that,  being  responsible,
she  ought to  behave  more  responsibly).  It is  meaningless  also to say
that  a  person  deserves  well  or  ill,  but  ought  not,  or that  she  does
not  deserve  at  all,  but  ought  to-although  we  may and  commonly
do  assert that  a person  ought  to get  what  she  (in  fact)  deserves,  or
not.  So  also are rights  a matter  of fact,  even  though  we tend to talk
about rights rather than responsibility  when  their contestability  rather
than their conventional grounding is prominent.  In this way, although
I  recognize  that a great deal  of careful  elaboration  needs  to be done,
the reality  of our  moral experience  is  established.
Although my interest in these matters is frankly philosophical more
than  practical,  tracing  rights  to the  myriad  concrete,  specific  details
that  compose  the  nomos of a  community  has,  I  believe,  important
consequences  for  the continuing,  often deeply divisive,  public debate
about  specific  rights.  It  may  help  us  to  avoid  a  sense  that  when
rights  are  involved,  nothing  less  than  the  whole  person,  his  dignity
and  self-respect,  is  at  stake,  and to  replace  the  stridency  of abstract
rhetoric  with  more  limited  and  more  manageable  issues.  So  also,  it
encourages  us to  reason  by  analogy  from  what  we know  and  agree
to be true,  instead of deducing  our conclusions from broad principles
that  are  instantly  opposed  by those  who  disagree.  Beyond  our  own
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we  do  not  approve,  deeply  held  beliefs  and  established  customs
different  from  our  own.
That,  so  far  as  I  can  tell,  is  the  case  for  natural  law  today,  one
to  which,  as  opposed  to  the  unconstrained  moral  indifference  of
existentialism,  I  happily  subscribe.  It  is,  I  recognize,  far  different
from the case for natural  law  as it was  at different  times in  the past.
How could it be otherwise?  The world that we inhabit  is so profoundly
different.  All  the  same,  there  is  continuity.  Qualifying  us  as  beings
duly  constituted,  rights  break through  the  morally  indifferent  causal
order  of  nature  and  establish  us  as  free  and  responsible,  therefore
moral,  beings.  The  nomos that gives  rise to rights  lies  closer to home
than  nature  or  divine  Providence;  but  it  comes  to  the  same  thing.
In  all  its  guises,  the  natural  law  tradition  was  and  is  nothing  more
or  less  than  an  affirmation  of the human condition  itself.